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Instead of making such rulings that curtail constitutional rights
abroad, the Supreme Court should be building up the First
Amendment overseas, protecting American interests outside of the
United States.
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INTRODUCTION

If American organizations have First Amendment rights
abroad, shouldn’t those rights extend to their foreign affiliates?1
Instead, last year the Supreme Court ruled in Agency for
International Development v. Alliance for Open Society
International, Inc. (“AOSI II”) 2 that Congress can compel the
speech 3 of international organizations abroad, even if the public
reasonably misattributes the compelled speech to domestic
organizations. 4 Seven years earlier, the Court had stated the
opposite in a case of the same name (“AOSI I”).5 AOSI I had focused
on domestic organizations, 6 holding that an act conditioning aid on
disavowing prostitution violated the domestic organizations’ First
Amendment rights, and even compelling the speech of the
domestic organization’s affiliates would violate the First
Amendment. 7 Yet AOSI II found the same act of compelling
affiliates’ speech constitutional if the affiliates are incorporated
outside of the United States.8
AOSI II presented a problem for the plaintiffs, since the
international organizations later had to choose between receiving
funding from the United States to combat HIV/AIDS abroad, and
alienating the very people the organizations intended to aid. 9
1. Throughout this Note, “affiliates” refers to the non-US organizations incorporated
overseas to carry out the international missions of the plaintiffs in accordance with the
local law of the affiliates’ nationalities. See Brief for Respondents at 5-9, Agency for Int’l
Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. (AOSI II), 140 S. Ct. 2082 (2020), 2020 WL 1154731, at
*6–8 (explaining the plaintiff’s mission and the affiliates’ role in this mission). To
demonstrate the unity between the organizations, both the affiliate and its American
counterpart each “uses a shared name, logo, branding, mission, and voice that conveys one
unified appearance and identity.” Id. at 7.
2. AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. 2082 (2020).
3. Compelled speech refers to the government dictating a person’s speech or actions.
See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 45-48 (2019). Forcing a person to adopt the
government’s speech generally violates the First Amendment of the US Constitution. See
id.
4. AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2089.
5. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. (AOSI I), 570 U.S. 205 (2013).
6. This Note uses the word “domestic” to describe entities formed within the United
States and uses the word “foreign” to describe entities formed outside of the United States.
This is because AOSI II uses the words “foreign” and “domestic,” focusing on the distinction
between these two entity types in determining when constitutional rights should be
extended beyond the borders of the United States.
7. AOSI I, 570 U.S. at 221.
8. AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2089.
9. See id. at 2085-86.
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Because of the ruling, Congress can now condition funding on
compelled speech for any domestic organization working with an
affiliate incorporated overseas. The First Amendment rights that
the Supreme Court had protected in 2013 were then invalidated by
the same Court in 2020.
This Note argues that the Supreme Court wrongly decided
AOSI II by ignoring the very First Amendment rights set out in AOSI
I. It asserts that the Court should grant certiorari to a case posing
the same issue to protect the First Amendment rights of American
organizations by disallowing the government to control the speech
of the American organizations’ foreign affiliates.10 In making those
assertions, this Note will examine the history of the First
Amendment internationally and how the Supreme Court has tried
to limit First Amendment rights abroad. It will then look at the
Court’s motivations and how it has gradually withdrawn First
Amendment rights abroad over the past fifty years, even while
promoting those same rights within the United States.11
Part I will examine Supreme Court cases on the
extraterritoriality of the First Amendment, observing the trend in
the last fifty years of diminishing the First Amendment outside of
the United States. Part II will analyze two cases with opposite
rulings, both named Agency for International Development v.
Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. Part III will compare
and analyze the Supreme Court’s rulings in AOSI I and II, identifying
the problems these contradicting decisions cause. Part IV will
compare AOSI I and II to previous extraterritorial First Amendment
cases, ultimately demonstrating how the Court has overlooked
Americans’ First Amendment rights abroad, deferring to the
government on almost all overseas activities. Part IV will also
explain why the Court needs to overturn AOSI II, and suggest a
potential solution for overturning the case.

10 . See id. at 2090 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“This case is not about the First
Amendment rights of foreign organizations. It is about—and has always been about—the
First Amendment rights of American organizations.”).
11. This Note focuses on the actions of the Supreme Court, and as such, does not
compare the Court’s actions with those of other countries’ courts. Academia would likely
benefit from a study comparing different countries’ extraterritorial treatment of their
constitutions.
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II. HISTORY OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY WITHIN THE UNITED
STATES
The First Amendment of the US Constitution protects freedom
of religion, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press.12 While
the First Amendment’s text is seemingly simple, courts have
expanded its protection through caselaw, particularly against
governmental regulation of speech. 13 The Supreme Court has
decided hundreds of First Amendment cases, mostly after 1970.14
With these cases, the Court has constructed multiple tests to
determine how and when to protect speech. 15 For example, the
directives regulating the content of speech are only constitutional
if they pass the demanding strict scrutiny test. 16 To pass strict
scrutiny, the regulation must (1) advance a compelling
government interest, (2) directly and substantially relate to
advancing that interest, and (3) be the least restrictive alternative
to achieve the government interest. 17 Compelled speech often
violates the First Amendment as speech the government has
coerced the speaker into adopting.18
Free speech scholar Timothy Zick argues that the Court’s
application of First Amendment standards and requirements
varies based on geography. 19 He has helpfully laid out three
categories to explain the Court’s different approaches to the First
Amendment: the intraterritorial, which deals with speech within
the United States’ territory; the territorial, which affects crossborder speech and association; and the extraterritorial, which
12 . The full text of the First Amendment reads “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
13. FARBER, supra note 3, at 3.
14. Id. at 4.
15. Id. at 14.
16. Id. at 23, 30-31.
17. R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny,
Intermediate Review, and “Reasonableness” Balancing, 8 ELON L. REV. 291, 293-94 (2016).
18 . FARBER, supra note 3, at 47 (“When speech is compelled, . . . individuals are
coerced into betraying their convictions. Forcing free and independent individuals to
endorse ideas they find objectionable is always demeaning . . . [A] law commanding
‘involuntary affirmation’ of objected-to beliefs would require ‘even more immediate and
urgent grounds’ than a law demanding silence.”).
19. See Timothy Zick, Territoriality and the First Amendment: Free Speech at—and
Beyond—Our Borders, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1543, 1545-46 (2010).
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pertains to speech solely outside of the United States’ borders.20
While the Supreme Court is resolutely and uniformly protective of
First Amendment rights of Americans within the United States,21 it
is less protective in cases involving foreign parties and
territories.22 The Court treats the intraterritorial, territorial, and
extraterritorial First Amendments differently, even applying
different standards to each First Amendment. 23 Generally, US
citizens
receive
full
First
Amendment
protections
intraterritorially, but Courts do not always extend the same degree
of intraterritorial First Amendment protections to non-US
citizens. 24 Often, similar problems face First Amendment rights
territorially and extraterritorially.25
A.

Early Extraterritorial Cases

The Court has also never extended constitutional rights to
non-US citizens located outside of US-controlled territory, making
clear that non-US citizens do not have First Amendment rights
abroad. 26 Questions remain regarding whether, and in what
contexts, US citizens have rights territorially and
extraterritorially.27 For the past half a century, the Court has given
great deference to the executive and legislative branches regarding
foreign or diplomatic issues at the expense of the extraterritorial
First Amendment.28 However, AOSI II goes further than previous
rulings by refusing to even consider American organizations’ First
Amendment rights through the speech of the organizations’ nonUS affiliates.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1545; see also Joel M. Gora, Free Speech Matters: The Roberts Court and the
First Amendment, 25 J. L. & POL’Y 63 (2016).
22. Zick, supra note 19, at 1545-46.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1545.
25. See generally id.
26. Anna Su, Speech Beyond Borders: Extraterritoriality and the First Amendment, 67
VAND. L. REV. 1373, 1413 (2014).
27. See id. at 1373 (“An extraterritorial First Amendment right has generally been
recognized by courts in the past, either explicitly or implicitly, in favor of citizens, although
it is often subject to national security requirements or foreign affairs considerations”); see
also Zick, supra note 19, at 1546.
28. The Court has been deferential at the expense of other Constitutional rights as
well to varying degrees. However, the scope of this Note focuses on the Court’s treatment
of the First Amendment in international contexts.
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Over the years, the Supreme Court has applied different
methods and rulings to the extraterritoriality of the Constitution.
In the nineteenth century, while there were conflicting rulings
about whether the Constitution applied to US territories,29 there
was a consensus that the Constitution did not apply abroad.30 In
the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court clarified its
position in a series of cases called the Insular Cases, with North
American territories receiving full constitutional protection, while
US territories in the Caribbean and Pacific Ocean received only
select “fundamental” rights.31
Nonetheless, in the 1950s and 1960s, the Warren Court was
much more favorable to the extraterritoriality of the Constitution,
including the First Amendment. 32 The Warren Court limited
governmental efforts to censor speech abroad, even to the point of
concern by other US political branches.33 During this period, the
Court recognized First Amendment rights for American citizens to
obtain passports to travel abroad 34 and gather news and
information from outside of the United States.35
B.

Erosion of Extraterritorial Protections under the Burger Court

Later Courts have gradually but consistently withdrawn these
robust extraterritorial First Amendment protections, starting with
the Burger Court in the 1970s through today. 36 In Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 37 the Burger Court’s first case involving the First

29. See KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE EVOLUTION OF
TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 24 (2009); see, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393,
450 (1857) (holding that due process rights apply in US territories).
30. See Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891) (“The constitution can have no
operation in another country.”).
31. BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN
EMPIRE 4-6 (2006); RAUSTIALA, supra note 29, at 26. As may be apparent to the reader, the
Court’s decisions were largely decided by racism; the Court was disinclined to extend
Constitutional protections to people it deemed as inferior, but was motivated to protect
American trade interests in US territories. SPARROW, supra note 31, at 10-11.
32. See Ronald K. Krotoszynski Jr., Transborder Speech, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 473,
481, 483-91 (2019).
33. See id.
34. See Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964); see also Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116, 143 (1958).
35. See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 310 (1965).
36. See Krotoszynski, supra note 32, at 481-82, 491-510.
37. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
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Amendment overseas, the Court acknowledged the Warren Court’s
past decisions but ultimately deferred to the government.38 In this
case, several universities hired Ernest Mandel, a Belgian journalist
and Marxist advocate, for a series of speaking engagements in the
United States, but the government denied Mandel’s visa
application. 39 The State Department offered a pretextual reason,
but in reality, it would not allow a communist to enter the country
and publicly express his views across the United States.40
Mandel sued—as did several American citizens who argued
they had a right to hear Mandel’s views and engage in a free
academic exchange. 41 The majority acknowledged that the First
Amendment protects the right to “receive information and ideas”
and that this right is especially important in the context of schools
and universities. 42 The majority also rejected the government’s
argument that the First Amendment was inapplicable because the
American plaintiffs could access Mandel’s ideas through books,
recordings, and telephone calls.43 The Court reasoned that these
alternatives are not the same as face-to-face debate and
discussion.44
Even though the Court reaffirmed previous holdings that a US
audience has a First Amendment right to receive ideas and
information from abroad, the majority decided this right was
irrelevant.45 The Court noted that, as Mandel was not a US citizen,
he did not have a constitutional right to enter the United States.46
The Court ultimately deferred to Congress’s plenary power to
make policies and rules excluding non-US citizens, finding the
executive branch’s exercise of power constitutional.47
Based on the majority’s dicta regarding Americans’ First
Amendment rights, it seems clear that the Court would have

38. Id. at 762-63, 769-70.
39. Id. at 756-57.
40. See id. at 767 (summarizing the plaintiffs’ argument that the State Department’s
reason for denying Mr. Mandel’s visa was pretextual, and was actually denied in violation
of the First Amendment).
41. Id. at 759-60.
42. Id. at 762-63.
43. See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 765.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 763-64 (citing Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965)).
46. Id. at 762.
47. Id. at 769-70.
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recognized a First Amendment right if Mandel had been inside the
United States, even as a non-US citizen. 48 If he were inside the
United States, he would have had the First Amendment right to
hold his lectures, and American citizens would not have needed to
sue based on their own First Amendment rights to hear him speak.
However, Mandel was a non-US citizen located outside of the
United States, so the case involved a party without constitutional
rights. 49 The American plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights were
removed by a degree because they were only implicated through
Mandel’s speech.50 Therefore, perhaps the Court did not have the
same motivations to protect Americans’ First Amendment rights,
and it could instead look for reasons to defer to the government.51
In a dissent, one justice compared the situation to a Warren Court
decision which had held that Americans have a First Amendment
right to receive communist political propaganda from abroad. 52
The dissent argued that the burden imposed on the American
plaintiffs in Mandel was far greater, and with less justification.53
But unlike the case during the Warren Court, the Burger Court used
Mandel as an opportunity to defer to the government, giving the
State Department the power to deny visas, even at the expense of
Americans’ First Amendment rights.54
Nine years later, the Court further curtailed First Amendment
rights for US citizens in Haig v. Agee.55 Philip Agee, a US citizen and

48. See Krotoszynski, supra note 32, at 494-95 (arguing Mandel reaffirmed previous
holdings that the First Amendment protected US audiences from receiving information
and ideas from abroad, while ultimately deferring to the State Department by allowing its
pretextual reason for denying a famous Marx scholar from speaking in the United States).
49. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762 (“It is clear that Mandel personally, as an unadmitted and
nonresident alien, had no constitutional right of entry to this country as a nonimmigrant
or otherwise.”).
50. See id. (“Indeed, the American appellees assert that ‘they sue to enforce their
rights, individually and as members of the American public, and assert none on the part of
the invited alien.’ . . . ‘Dr. Mandel is in a sense made a plaintiff because he is symbolic of the
problem.’”).
51. See Krotoszynski, supra note 32, at 495 (calling the State Department’s reasoning
for denying Mr. Mandel’s visa “entirely pretextual”).
52 . See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 781-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Lamont v.
Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965)).
53. See id. (citing Lamont, 381 U.S. at 308) (“When individual freedoms of Americans
are at stake, we do not blindly defer to broad claims of the Legislative Branch or Executive
Branch, but rather we consider those claims in light of the individual freedoms.”).
54. Compare Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, with Lamont, 381 U.S. 301.
55. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
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disillusioned former Central Intelligence Agency employee,
announced his intention to expose hundreds of active CIA agents
around the world, and then he did just that.56 The Secretary of State
revoked Agee’s passport because his “activities abroad [were]
causing or . . . likely to cause serious damage to the national
security or the foreign policy of the United States.” 57 Agee sued,
arguing, among other things, that the Secretary’s revocation of his
passport based on his speech violated his First Amendment right
to free speech and his Fifth Amendment right to travel.58
The majority highlighted the importance of national security,
stating “[i]t is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no governmental
interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.” 59
Thus, the Court found the Secretary’s revocation of Agee’s passport
constitutional, 60 agreeing that Agee’s actions could harm the
government and that revoking his passport was the only way the
government could limit Agee’s harmful actions. 61 The majority
carefully highlighted that the Secretary had revoked Agee’s
passport because of Agee’s conduct, not his speech.62 Moreover, the
majority stated, in dicta, that assuming First Amendment
protections apply abroad, previous cases indicated that the
government may prevent someone from obstructing military
operations and recruiting personnel.63
Despite previous Supreme Court cases that recognized a right
to travel abroad,64 this case had a conflict between such a right and
the imminent danger Agee posed to active CIA agents worldwide.65
The Court deferred to the government. 66 Since Agee’s conduct
56. Id. at 280, 284 n.3.
57. Id. at 311.
58. Id. at 306.
59. Id. at 307 (quoting Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964)).
60. Agee, 453 U.S. at 280-81.
61. Id. at 309 (citing Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965)) (“To the extent the
revocation of his passport operates to inhibit Agee, ‘it is an inhibition of action,’ rather than
of speech.”).
62. Su, supra note 26, at 1387.
63. Agee, 453 U.S. at 308 (citing Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716
(1931)).
64. See Aptheker, 378 U.S. 500; see also Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
65. See Krotoszynski, supra note 32, at 496 (“Agee clearly presented serious First
Amendment issues—at the heart of Agee’s program was an effort to disclose covert CIA
operations in foreign countries, activity that certainly involved public officials and matters
of public concern”).
66. Agee, 453 U.S. at 308–10.
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directly concerned national security and presented clear and
harmful consequences,67 the Court’s reasoning for ruling with the
government is plain: it was the only way to protect Americans from
Agee’s dangerous actions.68 Still, the Court eschewed applying the
First Amendment abroad in this context, preferring to find a
loophole instead of directly addressing the extraterritorial First
Amendment.69 Scholars characterize the Burger Court’s decisions
as furthering the Warren Court’s earlier rulings while curtailing
their extension of the extraterritorial First Amendment any
further.70
C.

Devaluing the First Amendment Abroad under the Roberts
Court

More recently, the Roberts Court held in Boumediene v. Bush71
that the Suspension Clause of the Constitution had full effect for
non-US citizens held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 72 While
Guantanamo Bay was outside of US territory, the area was “under
the complete and total control of our Government,” so the Court
found that the Suspension Clause applied. 73 The Supreme Court
pointed out that even though it had never extended constitutional
rights to non-citizens that the US government had detained outside
of the United States, precedent did not preclude a new ruling
because the circumstances there were unprecedented.74
While Boumediene is not a First Amendment case, it is
necessary to discuss this case in examining when the US

67. Id. at 308 (“Not only has Agee jeopardized the security of the United States, but
he has also endangered the interests of countries other than the United States—thereby
creating serious problems for American foreign relations and foreign policy.”).
68. Id. (“Restricting Agee’s foreign travel, although perhaps not certain to prevent all
of Agee’s harmful activities, is the only avenue open to the Government to limit these
activities.”).
69. See id. at 308-09 (making only a hypothetical argument about whether First
Amendment protections extend beyond national boundaries).
70 . Krotoszynski, supra note 32, at 498-99 (characterizing the Burger Court’s
extraterritorial First Amendment cases as deferential toward other political branches even
while declining to build on or overrule the Warren Court’s precedents regarding
transborder speech).
71. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
72. Id. at 771.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 770-71.
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Constitution applies outside of the United States.75 The Court took
a functional approach in determining whether the US Constitution
applied, looking at various factors, including who controlled the
area, the feasibility of applying constitutional rights, and any
barriers to extending constitutional rights. 76 Zick writes that
Boumediene is ultimately territorial, as the decision turns on US
control over Guantanamo Bay. 77 But the Court’s functional
approach in Boumediene supports an extraterritorial application of
the First Amendment rights of speech and association for non-US
citizens in US custody or located in US-controlled territory.78
Scholars characterize the Roberts Court as particularly
protective of Americans’ free speech, often restraining the
government’s actions in favor of Americans’ First Amendment
rights. 79 However, most Roberts Court First Amendment cases
address intraterritorial concerns rather than extraterritorial
ones. 80 One exception to the Roberts Court’s strong First
Amendment protections pertains to free speech abroad.81
In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,82 the Court upheld the
Patriot Act’s provision that prohibited knowingly providing
material support to an organization that the government
designated a foreign terrorist organization, even for the purposes
of peace and preventing terrorism.83 In such cases involving the
infringement of First Amendment rights, the Court is supposed to
apply strict scrutiny, and only find measures constitutional if they
are “narrowly tailored” to “further[] compelling governmental
interests.”84 But the majority in Holder did not mention nor apply

75 . See Su, supra note 26, at 1386 (characterizing the majority’s analysis in
Boumediene as a “global due process” approach).
76. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770-71.
77. Zick, supra note 19, at 1614.
78. Id.
79. See generally Gora, supra note 21; see also FARBER, supra note 3, at 14 (stating the
Roberts Court has built on previous Courts’ legacy in creating a strong First Amendment).
80. See generally Gora, supra note 21 (surveying a range of First Amendment cases
decided by the Roberts Court, almost all of which are intraterritorial cases).
81 . Id. at 121 (calling Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, which dealt with the
extraterritorial First Amendment, an “unfortunate departure[] from the Roberts Court’s
normally strong protection of First Amendment rights.”).
82. 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
83. Id. at 36.
84. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennet, 564 U.S. 721, 734 (2011);
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Com’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010); Wis. Fed. Election Com’n
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strict scrutiny. The Court applied its own analysis, finding the
statute “carefully drawn to cover only a narrow category of speech
to, under the direction of, or in coordination with foreign groups
that the speaker knows to be terrorist organizations,”85 despite the
broad interpretation of the term “material support.” 86 This
language may be similar to strict scrutiny, but it is less exacting.87
The law in Holder would not have passed the standard strict
scrutiny test the Court applied to intraterritorial First Amendment
cases, 88 and the opinion does not explain why it implemented a
new test.
Scholars have criticized Holder’s analysis as a weak version of
strict scrutiny, wondering if the case simply creates a new test that
is far more deferential to the government. 89 Based on the little
information available, and comparing it to other Court rulings of
extraterritorial and intraterritorial cases, First Amendment
scholar Ronald Krotoszynski pronounced that,
v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007); see Aziz Z. Huq, Preserving Political
Speech from Ourselves and Others, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 16, 16 (2012).
85. Holder, 561 U.S. at 26.
86. Id. at 30-31, 33. The Court also found that:
Given the sensitive interests in national security and foreign affairs at stake,
the political branches have adequately substantiated their determination
that, to serve the Government’s interest in preventing terrorism, it was
necessary to prohibit providing material support in the form of training,
expert advice, personnel, and services to foreign terrorist groups, even if
the supporters meant to promote only the groups’ nonviolent ends.
Id. at 36.
87. Contra Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennet, 564 U.S. 721, 734
(2011) (quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Election Com’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010)) (“‘Laws
that burden political speech are’ accordingly ‘subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the
Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest.’”).
88 . See David Cole, The First Amendment’s Borders: The Place of Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 147, 148
(2012) (noting that not even the government had argued that the statute would survive
strict scrutiny).
89. See id. (“[T]he Court engaged in only the most deferential review, and upheld the
law in the absence of any argument, much less evidentiary showing, that prohibiting
plaintiffs’ speech was necessary or narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest.”);
see also Krotoszynski, supra note 32, at 505 (“[T]he Supreme Court essentially applied a
weak, tepid version of strict scrutiny to a content-based criminal restriction of the freedom
of speech and association out of concern that more demanding judicial scrutiny would
interfere with important foreign affairs and national security objectives.”); cf. Gora, supra
note 21, at 121 (claiming that the Court applied strict scrutiny in Holder, but calling the
case an “unfortunate departure[] from the Roberts Court’s normally strong protection of
First Amendment rights.”).
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Holder Humanitarian Project essentially creates an exception
to the First Amendment for speech activity that takes place
outside the United States. It does so to avoid the prospect of
the federal judiciary applying the First Amendment in ways
that would potentially interfere with foreign affairs and
national security objectives that Congress and the President
seek to secure.90

In an unprecedented move, Holder allowed the government to
criminalize speech advocating for nonviolence. 91 Application of
Holder’s test in all First Amendment cases would be dangerous,
drastically changing the political landscape of the United States by
allowing the government to criminalize a larger category of
speech.92 Even though the Court did not clarify in what contexts
Holder’s analysis applied, scholars hypothesized that Holder is only
logical if courts apply this looser, more deferential test solely
outside of the United States, as it contradicted decades of caselaw
concerning domestic matters. 93 Thus, First Amendment
protections appeared to be weaker outside of the United States,
even for Americans.
Finally, in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,94 the majority
skipped the First Amendment question entirely to dismiss the case
for lack of standing. 95 In this case, Amnesty International and
similar organizations challenged the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, which allows the Attorney General and National
Intelligence Director to surveil individuals who are non-US
residents and located outside of the United States. 96 Amnesty
International argued that the statute violated multiple sections of
the Constitution, including the First Amendment. 97 The majority
was completely unconcerned with any unconstitutional actions by
the government, instead focusing on the fact that Amnesty
International did not have any specific evidence at the time of
90. Krotoszynski, supra note 32, at 508-09.
91. See Cole, supra note 88, at 149.
92. Id.
93. Id.; Huq, supra note 84, at 22.
94. 568 U.S. 398 (2013).
95 . Id. at 418 (concluding that “respondents’ self-inflicted injuries are not fairly
traceable to the Government’s purported activities under § 1881a, and their subjective fear
of surveillance does not give rise to standing”).
96. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2006 ed., Supp. V).
97. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. at 407.
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filing. 98 It is quite possible that the majority was less concerned
with the government violating constitutional rights because the
surveillance would target communications involving Amnesty
International and one or more foreign parties, not communications
between only Americans. 99 Regardless, the Court held that
Amnesty International lacked standing because it could not
identify any clear nonspeculative harm. 100 Three months later,
former NSA contractor Edward Snowden revealed the scope of the
NSA’s surveillance programs occurring domestically and
internationally.101
These cases demonstrate how the Supreme Court has
undermined any supposed First Amendment protections abroad
since the 1970s.102 Mandel and Haig reduced the Warren Court’s
declared rights for people to obtain US passports to travel abroad
and receive information from overseas.103 Later cases that found
for the government likely would have had opposite outcomes if the
cases had been intraterritorial.104 These cases show that the Court
uses discretionary-merits doctrines or other devices to avoid
reaching the merits of cases and instead defer to the
government.105 In cases where the First Amendment does apply,
the Court applies a lower, weaker standard to protect the Bill of
Rights beyond the United States’ borders. 106 Based on past First
Amendment claims, constitutional law scholar Anna Su writes that
“the door is clearly shut” on the extraterritorial First Amendment
claims of “enemy aliens,” as no case has extended constitutional
rights to non-US citizens beyond US-controlled territories. 107
However, many other questions on the extraterritoriality of the
98. Id. at 411.
99. Krotoszynski, supra note 32, at 505.
100. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. at 422 (“We hold that respondents lack Article III
standing because they cannot demonstrate that the future injury they purportedly fear is
certainly impending and because they cannot manufacture standing by incurring costs in
anticipation of non-imminent harm.”).
101. Su, supra note 26, at 1376.
102. Krotoszynski, supra note 32, at 475.
103. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280,
280-81 (1981).
104. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26, 20-31, 33 (2010)
(applying a less exacting form of strict scrutiny than is used in intraterritorial cases).
105. See Krotoszynski, supra note 32, at 505.
106. Id.
107. Su, supra note 26, at 1413-14.
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First Amendment remain.108 Clearly, the First Amendment cannot
apply to non-US citizens abroad, but it is unclear in what other
contexts the First Amendment might apply extraterritorially.109
III. AOSI (I & II) – CASE STUDIES ON EXTRATERRITORIAL
CENSORSHIP
AOSI I 110 and II 111 are the most recent cases in the line of
extraterritorial First Amendment cases. Both cases have focused
on these domestic organizations’ First Amendment rights abroad
with federal funding conditions based on compelled speech.
Congress outlined a comprehensive plan to combat the spread of
HIV/AIDS globally112 through the United States Leadership Against
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (the “Act”). 113
Congress authorized spending billions of dollars to fund
nongovernmental organizations in their efforts to combat
HIV/AIDS overseas, but Congress imposed two conditions on the
funding: 114 (1) no funds provided by the Act “may be used to
promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution or
sex trafficking”115 and (2) an organization may not use funds if the
organization “does not have a policy explicitly opposing
prostitution and sex trafficking.”116
Organizations receiving funding from the Act feared that
adopting Congress’s required policy of denouncing prostitution
would alienate persons working in the sex trade industry, isolating
people who are at a high risk of contracting HIV/AIDS and whose
cooperation is imperative to eliminate HIV/AIDS. 117 They feared
108. Id. at 1428.
109. See id. at 1429.
110. 570 U.S. 205 (2013).
111. 140 S. Ct. 2082 (2020).
112. AOSI I, 570 U.S. at 208.
113. Pub. L. No. 108-25, 117 Stat. 711 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 76017682).
114. 2 U.S.C. § 7631(e), (f).
115. Assistance to Combat HIV/AIDS, 22 U.S.C. § 7631(e). This condition, which was
not at issue in the cases, is not considered unconstitutional, as it simply defines the
parameters of the federal funding, and does not require anyone to adopt the government’s
policy. See Annie G. McBride, Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open
Society International, Inc.: Balancing Congress’s Spending Power Against First Amendment
Liberties, 59 LOY. L. REV. 1049, 1069-70 (2013).
116. Assistance to Combat HIV/AIDS, 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f).
117. McBride, supra note 115, at 1052.
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the policy would also complicate work in countries with legalized
prostitution, and force the organizations to censor themselves in
the public debate on the relationship between prostitution and the
spread of HIV/AIDS.118 By forcing organizations to choose between
adopting the government’s message or not receiving federal
funding, Congress is effectively silencing viewpoints it finds
unfavorable. 119 Moreover, the requirement turns a statute
intended to combat HIV/AIDS into Congress’s personal soapbox,
forcing organizations that aim to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS
to turn into mouthpieces for the government’s views on
prostitution.
A.

AOSI I - Protecting First Amendment Rights of Domestic
Organizations Working Abroad

In AOSI I, several domestic organizations sued the US Agency
for International Development, arguing that the second condition
of the Act was unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment. 120 The case focused on tensions between two
parts of the US Constitution: Congress’s spending power laid out in
the Constitution’s Spending Clause, 121 and the domestic
organizations’ free speech rights in the First Amendment.122 The
case focused on three other Supreme Court Cases involving this
same tension between Congress’s spending power and Americans’
First Amendment rights: Regan v. Taxation with Representation of
Washington, 123 Rust v. Sullivan, 124 and United States v. American
Library Association, Inc. 125 Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the
majority in a 6-2 decision,126 holding that the Act was compelled
118. Id.
119. Brief for Respondents at 26-35, AOSI I, 570 U.S. 205 (No. 12-10).
120. AOSI I, 570 U.S. at 210-11.
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States.”).
122. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.”).
123. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
124. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
125. 539 U.S. 194 (2003); see also McBride, supra note 115 (showing an in-depth
analysis of the Court’s weighing of the Spending Clause and the First Amendment in AOSI
I).
126. Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, and Sotomayor joined. Justice Scalia
filed a dissenting opinion, and Justice Thomas joined him. Justice Kagan did not take any
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speech, which violated the First Amendment: “[b]y demanding that
funding recipients adopt—as their own—the Government’s view
on an issue of public concern, the condition by its very nature
affects ‘protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded
program.’”127
The government argued that the conditions did not violate the
First Amendment because domestic organizations could either (1)
accept funding from the Act and comply with the requirements but
establish affiliates with contrary views on prostitution; or (2)
decline funding, and express their own views on prostitution, but
create affiliates solely to receive and administer funding.128 But the
majority found neither of the government’s options acceptable to
prevent First Amendment violations.129 The Court reasoned that
although an organization can use affiliates to exercise its First
Amendment rights outside of a federal program’s scope, such
dynamic does not allow Congress to force an affiliate to adopt
Congress’s beliefs. 130 Roberts’s opinion implied that an
organization’s affiliates also had First Amendment rights.131 Thus,
forcing any affiliate to espouse Congress’s beliefs would be
unconstitutional, violating not only the original organization’s, but
also its affiliate’s First Amendment rights. 132 Further, the Court
suggested that an organization’s ties to an affiliate espousing the
government’s view on prostitution could run the risk that people
would confuse the government’s view with the organization’s
view. 133 The organization’s affiliate could therefore espouse
Congress’s beliefs “only at the price of evident hypocrisy.”134

part in this case. Justice Kagan likely recused herself because she had worked on the Act
as Solicitor General. Adam Liptak, Justices Say U.S. Cannot Impose Antiprostitution Condition
TIMES
(June
20,
2013)
on
AIDS
Grants,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/21/us/court-finds-aids-programs-rules-violatefree-speech.html [https://perma.cc/ZT8D-558G].
127. AOSI I, 570 U.S. at 218 (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 197).
128. Id. at 219.
129. Id. at 219-20.
130. Id. at 219.
131. Id. at 219-20.
132. Id. (“If the affiliate is distinct from the recipient, the arrangement does not afford
a means for the recipient to express its beliefs.”).
133. AOSI I, 570 U.S. at 219.
134. Id. at 218.
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Only Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented.135 Justice Scalia’s
dissent sided with the government, stating that the conditions did
not violate the Free Speech Clause because the organizations could
decline funding if they did not want to promote Congress’s views
on prostitution. 136 Justice Scalia’s dissent focused on the same
domestic funding issues as the majority, again working within the
framework of Taxation with Representation of Washington, Rust,
and American Library Association.137
Despite its international implications, AOSI I focused on
domestic First Amendment rights instead of the extraterritoriality
issue. As Su points out, briefs and oral arguments often referenced
the international implications of the case, and the government
emphasized that the program was “primarily conducted in ‘foreign
territory’ and ‘distant lands,’ hence the need for the Policy
Requirement to function as an ex ante commitment.” 138 But the
Court’s opinion does not speak of extraterritorial First Amendment
rights or anything other than the right of citizens and domestic
organizations.
Even so, after AOSI I, scholars speculated how the case would
affect the extraterritoriality of the First Amendment. Su was
optimistic that the Court would consider an extraterritorial First
Amendment in select future cases. 139 She argued that the Free
Speech Doctrine should apply to American citizens everywhere
and to non-US citizens when subjected to government actions, and
was hopeful that future courts would decide so as well.140
B.

AOSI II - Declining to Extend First Amendment Rights to
Domestic Organizations' Foreign Affiliates

AOSI I made it clear that the compelled speech provision
violated domestic organizations’ constitutional rights. But after the
ruling, the government determined that AOSI I’s holding did not

135. Id. at 221-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 225-26.
137. Id. at 222-25.
138. Su, supra note 26, at 1426 (arguing that the court implicitly advocates for an
extraterritorial First Amendment in AOSI I).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1429.
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apply to foreign organizations. 141 A year after AOSI I, the
government issued guidance stating that the compelled speech
provision in the Act would still apply to foreign organizations,
including foreign organizations closely affiliated with American
organizations. 142 The same domestic organizations that were
plaintiffs in AOSI I sued again, arguing that the Act was still
unconstitutional because it forced the organizations’ foreign
affiliates to adopt Congress’s language as their own, violating the
domestic organizations’ First Amendment rights.143
The plaintiffs pointed out that the defendant, US Agency for
International Development, actually encourages organizations to
work through affiliates incorporated in the country where the
organization is performing HIV/AIDS work.144 Many of US Agency
for International Development’s federal funding opportunities are
only available for locally incorporated foreign nongovernmental
organizations. 145 Despite the almost identicality in parties and
circumstances, and AOSI I’s language hinting otherwise,146 in 2020
the Court made a ruling opposite to AOSI I, finding that the Act can
compel speech of foreign organizations with domestic affiliates
under the Constitution.147
The plaintiffs had claimed that applying the compelled speech
provision of the Act to foreign affiliates of the domestic
organizations violated the domestic organizations’ First
Amendment rights.148 The plaintiffs argued that the public would
likely incorrectly attribute the foreign organizations’ required
speech to its American affiliates, so even if the domestic
organizations did not adopt Congress’s language themselves, they
would appear to adopt Congress’s views.149 Either people would
misattribute the speech to the domestic organization, or the
organization would appear to offer conflicting messages,
141. AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2085-86; Brief for Respondents at 18, AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. 2082
(No. 19-177).
142. Brief for Respondents at 18, AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. 2082 (No. 19-177).
143. Id. at 19; AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2085-86.
144. Brief for Respondents at 6-7, AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. 2082 (No. 19-177).
145. Id. at 7.
146. AOSI I, 570 U.S. at 219-20 (“If the affiliate is more clearly identified with the
recipient, the recipient can express those beliefs only at the price of evident hypocrisy.”).
147. AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2089.
148. Id. at 2087.
149. Id. at 2088-89.
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proffering their own beliefs and Congress’s contrary beliefs.150 The
plaintiffs’ argument was quite similar to the majority’s reasoning
in AOSI I, when Chief Justice Roberts refuted the government’s
claims that the plaintiffs could simply form affiliates to espouse
Congress’s views.151 In fact, the plaintiffs claimed that the Court’s
2013 decision already encompassed the plaintiffs’ foreign
affiliates, so the Court had already resolved this issue.152 But the
majority in AOSI II disagreed with both claims, finding that foreign
organizations operating abroad simply do not have constitutional
rights.153
1. The Majority’s Infringement on First Amendment Rights
Justice Kavanaugh wrote for the majority for AOSI II, 154
arguing that Congress may impose the same stipulations on foreign
organizations’ stances on prostitution and sex trafficking that the
Court had found to be unconstitutional for domestic
organizations.155 In his majority writing, Justice Kavanaugh made
the case appear as simple as possible, writing only four pages,156
splitting his argument into two main points based on “two bedrock
principles of American law,” 157 and then distilling the plaintiffs’
arguments into two main points that he rebuked.158
First, Justice Kavanaugh unequivocally stated that foreign
citizens outside of US territories do not possess constitutional
rights, drawing on multiple cases supposedly asserting this
claim. 159 While he conceded that foreign citizens may have
150. Id.
151. See AOSI I, 570 U.S. at 219 (“Affiliates cannot serve that purpose when the
condition is that a funding recipient espouse a specific belief as its own . . . If the affiliate is
more clearly identified with the recipient, the recipient can express those beliefs only at
the price of evident hypocrisy.”).
152. AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2089.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2085-89. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch
joined the majority. Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion, advocating for the same
stance as Justice Scalia had made in his dissent in AOSI I. Id. at 2089-90 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, and Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor joined him. Justice Kagan did not take any part in this case.
155. Id. at 2089 (Kavanaugh, J., majority).
156. See id. at 2085-89.
157. Id. at 2086.
158. AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2088.
159. Id. at 2086-87.
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constitutional rights within the United States, 160 and may even
possess some constitutional rights within US territories or an area
where the United States has control, 161 Justice Kavanaugh was
firm: the Court has never allowed non-US citizens to assert
constitutional rights outside of the United States or its
territories. 162 Justice Kavanaugh emphasized the necessity in
allowing the government to carry out actions abroad that the Court
would find unconstitutional if carried out on American soil. 163
While the majority did note that Congress may enact laws to give
foreign citizens statutory rights to regulate US officials’ conduct
abroad, this was not the case here.164
Second, the majority asserted that separately incorporated
organizations are considered separate legal entities with separate
legal obligations. 165 Based on these two principles, the majority
explicitly stated: “As foreign organizations operating abroad,
plaintiffs’ foreign affiliates possess no rights under the First
Amendment.” 166 According to the majority, if the Court did not
draw this clear line, lower courts would be unable to determine if
a foreign affiliate was closely related enough to interfere with a
domestic organization’s First Amendment rights.167 Lower courts
would apparently be too confused without a “principled basis” to
determine the scope of a domestic organization’s First Amendment
rights .168
160. Id. at 2086 (“As the Court has recognized, foreign citizens in the United States
may enjoy certain constitutional rights—to take just one example, the right to due process
in a criminal trial.”).
161. Id. (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 755-71 (2008)).
162. Id. at 2086. But see Nicholas Romanoff, Note, The “Bedrock Principle that Wasn’t:
Alliance for Open Society II and the Future of the Noncitizens’ Extraterritorial Constitution,
53 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 345, 353-72 (2021) (refuting Justice Kavanaugh’s so-called
“bedrock principle” that non-US citizens outside of the United States do not have
constitutional rights).
163. AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2086-87 (“If the rule were otherwise, actions by American
military, intelligence, and law enforcement personnel against foreign organizations or
foreign citizens in foreign countries would be constrained by the foreign citizens’
purported rights under the U. S. Constitution.”).
164. Id. at 2087.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167 . Id. (“Plaintiffs’ carve-out not only would deviate from that fundamental
principle, but also would enmesh the courts in difficult line-drawing exercises—how
closely identified is close enough?—and leave courts without any principled basis for
making those judgments.”).
168. AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2087.
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2. The Dissent’s Focus on American Organizations’ Rights
Justice Breyer’s dissent asserted that AOSI II had the same
subject matter as AOSI I: American organizations’ First
Amendment rights. 169 Justice Breyer condensed the dissent into
three principles: (1) the messages at issue belong to American
speakers, (2) foreign affiliates are critical for conveying the
American organizations’ messages abroad, and (3) forcing the
foreign affiliates to espouse Congress’s beliefs distorts the
American organizations’ speech.170 Breyer started with a history of
AOSI I, followed by the history of AOSI II in the lower courts,
demonstrating that the two cases essentially asked the same
question: whether the provision under the Act requiring an
organization or its affiliate to adopt Congress’s speech violates the
domestic organization’s First Amendment rights. 171 Domestic
organizations often create foreign affiliates to operate abroad, and
sometimes foreign governments even require it.172
Justice Breyer highlighted one of the plaintiffs’ arguments:
people will misattribute the foreign affiliate’s compelled speech to
its domestic organization. 173 In a strategy to show a consistent
message to the populations they want to protect, the plaintiffs and
their affiliates do their best to appear as a single cohesive unit
despite having several affiliates, even going so far as to have the
same fonts and logos. 174 Therefore, Justice Breyer’s dissent
reasoned that when an affiliate is forced to spout Congress’s
harmful beliefs, all of the affiliates also appear to spout Congress’s
harmful beliefs, including those in the United States.175
The dissent pointed out that AOSI II is a speech misattribution
case, as anything Congress forces a foreign affiliate to assert would

169. Id. at 2090 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 2099.
171. Id. at 2090-95.
172. Id. at 2094.
173. Id. at 2094.
174. AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2094 (“Respondents, together with their affiliates, convey a
clear, consistent message to high-risk populations, government officials, healthcare
professionals, prospective employees, and private donors across the globe . . . To an
outside observer, respondents and their affiliates are a single, cohesive unit. They speak
as one.”).
175. Id. at 2094-95 (“Audiences everywhere attribute speech based on whom they
perceive to be speaking, not on corporate paperwork they will never see.”).
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undoubtedly be misattributed to all its affiliates.176 The domestic
organizations have a right to not have the Act’s compelled language
attributed to them: “The First Amendment question therefore
hinges, as it did before, on what an objective observer sees, hears,
and understands when respondents speak through their foreign
affiliates.”177 The Court’s decision in AOSI I may have helped the
plaintiffs avoid adopting Congress’s views on prostitution, but the
plaintiffs will suffer just as much if people misattribute their
affiliates’ forced speech to them.178
Justice Breyer also pointed out that American courts have
strong and uniform speech misattribution caselaw.179 Going over
Supreme Court caselaw, Justice Breyer found that AOSI II was very
similar to Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group
of Boston, Inc.,180 a case about whether a group organizing a local
parade in Boston had to allow an affinity group to march in the
parade. 181 In that case, the Court held that forcing the parade
organizers to allow the affinity group to march in the parade
distorted the organizers’ speech, “alter[ing] the expressive content
of the parade,” and therefore violated the First Amendment. 182
Breyer described the plaintiffs in AOSI II as similar in crafting their
message to the plaintiffs in Hurley, except on an international
platform.183 Based on the Court’s ruling in Hurley, forcing foreign
affiliates to adopt Congress’s stance on prostitution would also
violate the First Amendment, as observers would misattribute the

176. Id. at 2095 (“What mattered in AOSI I was thus how ‘clearly identified’ the
affiliates were with respondents. . . . And what matters now is once again how ‘clearly
identified’ the affiliates are with respondents, not the fact that the affiliates were
incorporated as foreign legal entities.”).
177. Id.
178. Id. (“[I]n the wake of our ruling, respondents have continued to suffer the exact
same First Amendment harm.”).
179. AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2095-96 (“[I]n the First Amendment context, the corporate
veil is not an iron curtain. Just the opposite. We attribute speech across corporate lines all
the time.”).
180. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
181. Id. at 561-62.
182. Id. at 572-73.
183. AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2097-98 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Respondents in this case
have done the Veterans Council one better. They have carefully constructed a cogent
message and marshaled their clearly identified foreign affiliates to express it across the
globe.”).
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compelled speech to domestic organizations with First
Amendment rights.184
Further refuting the majority, Justice Breyer stated that the
majority’s claim that foreign citizens outside of US territories do
not have First Amendment rights was irrelevant to the matter at
hand in AOSI II.185 The plaintiffs are domestic organizations, and
their speech is at issue in the case. 186 He also mentioned that
Justice Kavanaugh’s principles are not as deeply entrenched in the
law as Justice Kavanaugh attested.187 Even Boumediene, which the
majority cited to demonstrate that non-US citizens do not have
constitutional protections outside of US-controlled territory, 188
actually speaks against instituting a formalistic approach like the
one the majority applied. 189 Boumediene had looked at objective
factors in making its decisions, such as the level of US control of the
territory, the nature of the constitutional protection, and the
foreign citizen’s status in relation to the United States. 190 While
Justice Breyer acknowledged that a cautious attitude toward
applying the Constitution abroad was prudent,191 he asserted that
AOSI II is first and foremost addresses the right of domestic
organizations.192And while the majority may have claimed that its
ruling drew a firm line and made clear who has First Amendment
rights abroad, 193 Justice Breyer pointed out that the majority’s
ruling still left many constitutional issues unresolved.194
184. See id.
185. Id. at 2099-102.
186. Id. at 2099.
187. Id. at 2099-102.
188. Id. at 2086 (Kavanaugh, J., majority) (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723,
770-71 (2008).
189. AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2100-01 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Boumediene, 553 U.S.
at 764).
190. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766).
191 . Id. at 2100 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“There is wisdom in our past restraint.
Situations where a foreign citizen outside U. S. Territory might fairly assert constitutional
rights are not difficult to imagine.”).
192. Id. at 2099.
193. Id. at 2089 (Kavanaugh, J., majority).
194. Breyer included many hypothetical issues to illustrate his point:
Long-term permanent residents are “foreign citizens.” Does the
Constitution therefore allow American officials to assault them at will while
“outside U. S. territory”? Many international students attend college in the
United States. Does the First Amendment permit a public university to
revoke their admission based on an unpopular political stance they took on
social media while home for the summer? Foreign citizens who have never
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IV. THE HARM OF CONFLICTING FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
AOSI I and II are almost identical, with the same parties, the
same Act, and the same facts.195 The Court’s new interpretation of
the Act affects the plaintiffs through its foreign affiliates as much
as the old interpretation. The majority in AOSI I even speaks
against forcing domestic organizations’ affiliates to espouse
Congress’s beliefs, as an affiliate clearly identified with the
domestic organization could express those beliefs “only at the
price of evident hypocrisy.”196 Regardless of the nationality of the
affiliate, any speech made would be compelled speech that people
would attribute to the whole organization. Thus, theoretically, the
cases should have the same outcome.
But the biggest difference between the two cases is that the
Act in AOSI I directly implicates domestic organizations’ First
Amendment interests, while the reinterpreted Act in AOSI II only
indirectly implicates domestic organizations’ First Amendment
interests through their foreign affiliates.197 The Court seemed to
find this difference critical, because it changed course, ruling for
the government where it had previously ruled for the domestic
organizations.198 In fact, the Court in AOSI II even disregarded the
language in AOSI I, stating that the government forcing affiliates to
espouse Congress’s language is unconstitutional. 199 Instead, the
majority in AOSI II chose to ignore AOSI I’s precedent. The majority
ignored the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights laid out in AOSI I to
defer to Congress because the case only involved speech directly
made by foreign organizations.200 Despite the strong protection of
the First Amendment rights of domestic organizations abroad

set foot in the United States, for that matter, often protest when Presidents
travel overseas. Does that mean Secret Service agents can, consistent with
our Constitution, seriously injure peaceful protestors abroad without any
justification?
Id. at 2100-01.
195. AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2085-86.
196. AOSI I, 570 U.S. at 219.
197. See Romanoff, supra note 162, at 387 (“While there are reasons to think that the
nonparty NGOs in AOSI II had substantial connections to the United States, the Court
considered none of them.”).
198. AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2085-86.
199. See AOSI I, 570 U.S. at 219 (“If the affiliate is more clearly identified with the
recipient, the recipient can express those beliefs only at the price of evident hypocrisy.”).
200. See AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2087-88.

2022]

FAR, FREE, AWAY?

985

articulated in AOSI I,201 AOSI II ignored the same rights of non-US
citizens and gave Congress almost carte blanche when it comes to
non-US citizens abroad.202
While the plaintiffs are the same in both cases, the cases are
framed differently by each majority.203 Su highlights the fact that
AOSI I had many references to international implications in the
parties’ briefs, oral arguments, and amicus briefs.204 Yet, this same
emphasis on internationalism and its consequences abroad is not
present in the Court’s ruling.205 Instead, the Court treats the case
as an issue of Congressional spending versus a domestic
organization’s First Amendment rights.206 The case focuses on the
important domestic implications of compelled speech through
Congressional spending.207 AOSI I applies to all cases involving a
government’s attempt to control speech through spending with
strong domestic implications—whether that government body be
a local town council or Congress.208 AOSI II does not have this same
domestic applicability.
V. THE POST-AOSI II LEGAL LANDSCAPE
AOSI II provides a bleak future for non-US citizens outside of
the United States seeking constitutional relief. The seemingly strict
language is quite clear, yet has several gaps. Questions remain
about when it should apply and why the Court took such a strict
ruling.

201. See generally AOSI I, 570 U.S. at 208-21.
202. See AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2086-87.
203. Compare AOSI I, 570 U.S. at 217-19 (focusing on the First Amendment rights of
individuals rather than their location or citizenship status), with AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 208687 (focusing on the foreign organizations implicated in the domestic plaintiffs’ argument).
204. Su, supra note 26, at 1426 (arguing that AOSI I hinted that the court might build
on the extraterritorial First Amendment in the future).
205. See generally AOSI I, 570 U.S. at 217-21.
206 . Id. at 218 (“By requiring recipients to profess a specific belief, the Policy
Requirement goes beyond defining the limits of the federally funded program to defining
the recipient.”).
207. See McBride, supra note 115.
208. See generally id. at 1073-75.
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The Court’s Obliteration of the First Amendment Abroad

The Court has demonstrated a strong interest in protecting
domestic organizations’ First Amendment rights,209 which AOSI I
further articulated. But AOSI II did not find this interest significant
enough to protect the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. The
majority disregarded the language in AOSI I asserting that
Congress compelling the speech of foreign organizations would be
hypocritical to the whole organization’s actual stance, and the
stance of its domestic affiliates. The language is directly
attributable to the circumstances in AOSI II, as forcing an affiliate
to adopt language contrary to the domestic organizations’ stance
would appear hypocritical, discounting the organizations’ attempt
at a unified organization with a unified message. But instead of
applying its reasoning from AOSI I, the majority in AOSI II ignored
this analysis and deferred to Congress.
AOSI II does not have the same domestic applicability as AOSI
I.210 Therefore, it cannot have the same domestic emphasis as AOSI
I. The plaintiffs in AOSI II focus on their First Amendment rights
only through the foreign affiliates’ compelled speech.211 Thus, this
case cannot be framed as a domestic issue with intraterritorial
applications. There may have been some domestic implications in
terms of misattributed speech through the compelled speech of
affiliates. 212 But this argument was already addressed in AOSI I
when the majority hinted that forcing a domestic affiliate to
espouse Congress’s beliefs would infringe upon a domestic
affiliate’s rights.213 In terms of applicability, AOSI II was therefore
a whole new case with only extraterritorial applications. The lack
of domestic applicability of AOSI II is especially relevant to a
Supreme Court that has been historically hesitant to extend First
Amendment rights extraterritorially and has made every
indication that it intends to continue on this trajectory of limiting

209. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
210. See infra supra Part III.
211. AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2086-87.
212 . See Brief for Respondents at 36-37, AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. 2082 (No. 19-177)
(focusing on piercing the corporate veil rather than the domestic-foreign distinction).
213. See AOSI I, 570 U.S. at 219 (“If the affiliate is distinct from the recipient, the
arrangement does not afford a means for the recipient to express its beliefs.”).
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First Amendment rights abroad.214 Because AOSI II did not have a
domestic applicability like AOSI I had, the Court was not as
motivated to protect the American plaintiffs, as the Americans’
territorial First Amendment rights were not at stake. Thus, the
Court could defer to the government without fear of infringing on
Americans’ territorial rights.
The plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights in AOSI II are not as
direct as those in AOSI I. In the second case, the speech of foreign
affiliates indirectly implicates the plaintiffs’ rights.215 By arguing
for an American plaintiff’s First Amendment rights through the
speech of a non-US citizen, AOSI II is similar to Mandel 216 and
Amnesty International USA. 217 In those cases, too, American
plaintiffs argued that their First Amendment rights were being
infringed upon through the speech of non-US citizens, even though
the non-US citizens did not have First Amendment rights.218 The
Court did not wholeheartedly reject these arguments.219 However,
the American plaintiffs did not receive the desired result, as the
Court ultimately deferred to the government in both cases.220 In
AOSI II, the Court may have acknowledged the domestic
organizations’ First Amendment rights in AOSI I,221 but the Court
ultimately discounted these rights by deferring to the government
at the expense of the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. 222 The
Court seems to take extraterritorial First Amendment claims far
less seriously when the government only infringes upon
Americans’ rights indirectly, through the speech of non-US citizens.
This is not the first time this has occurred: as we have seen,
the Supreme Court has given much more leniency to the
government at the expense of Americans’ First Amendment rights

214. See supra Part II. But see Romanoff, supra note 162, at 352-53 (suggesting that
AOSI II was so against extending constitutional rights abroad because of Kavanaugh’s
appointment to the Supreme Court, who had been against the extraterritorial First
Amendment as a D.C. Circuit judge).
215. AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2086.
216. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
217. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013).
218. Id. at 401, 406-07; Mandel, 408 U.S. at 759-60.
219. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. at 401-02, 411 (dismissing the case for lack of harm
to American plaintiffs); Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762-63, 765.
220. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. at 401-02; Mandel, 408 U.S. at 769-70.
221. AOSI I, 570 U.S. at 220.
222. AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2089.
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when dealing with government actions abroad. 223 For example,
while Mandel recognized Americans’ First Amendment rights to
“receive information and ideas,” the Court ultimately disregarded
this because Congress had a right to make policies to exclude nonUS citizens. 224 So, the Court found that the executive branch’s
decision to prevent a non-US citizen from entering the United
States was legal, despite its infringement on Americans’ First
Amendment rights. 225 In Amnesty International USA, the Court
again ignored the very probable infringement on Amnesty
International’s First Amendment rights because the government
was spying on foreign actors and only indirectly spying on
Americans. 226 The Court’s leniency to the government was most
apparent in Holder, 227 with legal experts classifying the Court’s
standard of review as “a weak, tepid version of strict scrutiny to a
content-based criminal restriction of the freedom of speech and
association.” 228 AOSI II appears to follow the long but clear
trajectory of the last fifty years of the Supreme Court eroding any
existence of an extraterritorial First Amendment. But AOSI II goes
even further than simply diminishing the extraterritorial First
Amendment. The case draws a clear line between American and
non-American, regardless of that affect on Americans.229
The Court particularly shies away from intervening in the
other branches of the federal government’s decisions abroad,
wanting to allow the government to perform necessary functions
abroad. 230 Many cases, including Agee, Holder, and Amnesty
International USA, provide examples of the Court’s fear that the
government will be unable to operate abroad, particularly within

223. See supra Part II.
224. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762-63.
225. Id. at 769-70.
226. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 407 (2013).
227. Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
228. Krotoszynski, supra note 32, at 505.
229. See Romanoff, supra note 162, at 387.
230 . See Krotoszynski, supra note 32, at 482 (“The federal government has
successfully invoked imperatives associated with diplomatic, military, and national
security concerns to justify content- and viewpoint-based speech regulations that burden
or completely prohibit First Amendment activity based on the locus of the speech activity
being outside the United States.”); see also Romanoff, supra note 162, at 399 (arguing that
AOSI II should be interpreted as an emphasis on the separation of powers).
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areas of national security.231 As we have seen, the Court will go out
of its way to defer to the government in cases regarding non-US
citizens abroad on the off chance that the Court’s decision might
affect national security. 232 Even in AOSI II, Justice Kavanaugh
underscored the importance of allowing the government to carry
out its goals abroad and promote its interests at the expense of
domestic organizations’ First Amendment rights.233
Constitutional law scholar Aziz Huq tries to square the Court's
First Amendment ruling in Holder with other, more protective
decisions by suggesting that the Court adopt different standards
between internal and external threats. 234 National security law
scholar David Cole theorized that Holder is only logical if it applies
to cases involving (1) the government’s regulation of speech (2)
coordinated with foreign organizations (3) to protect national
security interests.235 AOSI II meets the first two prongs of Cole’s
hypothesis, but not the third: a statute aimed at combating the
HIV/AIDS epidemic is not a clear national security risk the way
second-guessing the State Department’s decision to deny a visa in
Mandel or invalidating the Patriot Act in Holder might have been.
In Agee, Holder, and Amnesty International USA, the Court had
clear national security concerns in mind when making its
rulings. 236 With AOSI II, those national security issues are not
present. While the majority hinted at national security concerns by
stating that Congress may condition funding based on a foreign
231. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. at 407, 422 (declining to consider any violation of
the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights because the plaintiffs could not demonstrate the
clear nonspeculative harm of the government surveilling people not living in the United
States); Holder, 561 U.S. at 30-31, 33 (creating a new form of strict scrutiny that appears
to only be applicable abroad); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 280-81, 309 (1981) (deferring to
the Secretary of State by highlighting that the plaintiff was targeted by his conduct rather
than speech and underlining the importance of national security in such cases). National
security also appears to be a rationale for deferring to the government, even when First
Amendment issues are at stake. See AOSI I, 570 U.S. at 221-22, 224 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(inexplicably creating hypothetical examples involving funding Hamas to argue that the
Act’s funding provisions did not violate the First Amendment).
232. Romanoff, supra note 162, at 391.
233. AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2087-88.
234. Huq, supra note 84, at 17.
235. Cole, supra note 88, at 149-50, 164-77.
236. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. at 402; Holder, 561 U.S. at 36; Agee, 453 U.S. at 305
(quoting Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964)) (“It is ‘obvious and
unarguable’ that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the
Nation.”).
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organization’s “ideological commitments” such as “antiterrorism,”237 AOSI I and II implicates an Act aimed at combating
the global HIV/AIDS epidemic, which does not directly affect
national security concerns.
Some have argued that AOSI I and II may have security
concerns because American foreign aid has many objectives,
including promoting national security.238 But even so, any national
security implications of the Act would be minor. And if Congress
truly needed to prevent terrorism, precedent in Holder indicates
that Congress’s statute would only have to prevail against a
weaker, tepid form of strict scrutiny.239 Moreover, there are other
means of promoting the First Amendment abroad: the government
may use its spending powers or diplomatic influence to encourage
other nations to adopt First Amendment standards. 240 The
Supreme Court’s deference to the government on extraterritorial
issues at the expense of the First Amendment is not reasonable, nor
is its continued diminishing of First Amendment rights abroad.
Even so, the majority wanted to draw a hard line in the sand,
demolishing what little extraterritorial First Amendment rights
may still exist in case AOSI II might somehow affect national
security interests in the future.
The Court prioritizes making clear rules about the
applicability of the Constitution in an era of globalization.241 This
priority is quite important, as borders begin to blur with the rise of
global commerce and the ease of transborder communication.242
The majority in AOSI II underscored the importance of clearly
laying out when the First Amendment applies abroad. 243
237. AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2087-88.
238. See, e.g., Romanoff, supra note 162, at 395-96.
239. See Charles W. Rhodes, Speech, Subsidies, and Traditions: AID v. AOSI and the
First Amendment, 2012-13 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 363, 390-91 (2013) (suggesting a court could
apply Holder’s lower standard of strict scrutiny in cases of terrorism); see also
Krotoszynski, supra note 32, at 505; Cole, supra note 88, at 148 (finding that Holder
indicates that extraterritorial First Amendment cases must require a weaker standard of
review than intraterritorial cases).
240. Zick, supra note 19, at 1589.
241. See id. at 1580.
242. Id. (“The once-clear line between domestic and foreign speech has begun to
blur.”).
243. AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2089 (“Plaintiffs’ carve-out not only would deviate from that
fundamental principle, but also would enmesh the courts in difficult line-drawing
exercises—how closely identified is close enough?—and leave courts without any
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Regardless of how clear the majority’s purported clearly drawn
line really is, why does this line need to be where the majority drew
it? As the dissent stated, the “bedrock principles”244 are not nearly
as well-founded as the majority claims. Nor is the answer as clear
as the majority claims, with many questions still uncertain.
By taking such a hardline ruling against affiliates’ speech, the
Court has drastically limited American citizens’ First Amendment
rights abroad. Suddenly, domestic organizations have no First
Amendment rights unless they do not work with any foreign
affiliates. But domestic organizations often must create foreign
affiliates to defer to local law in other countries.245 The US Agency
for International Development even has many programs where
organizations can only receive federal funding through foreign
affiliates.246 In effect, domestic organizations must choose between
adopting Congress’s views and accepting federal funding or staying
true to their word and missing out on funding that could help many
vulnerable people. The plaintiffs faced this same dilemma before
AOSI I, before the Court held that these domestic organizations had
First Amendment rights and should not have to make this choice.
The plaintiffs should not be back where they started.
The Supreme Court is so concerned that its rulings may
infringe the government’s ability to operate abroad, that they are
unwilling to acknowledge the existence of almost any First
Amendment rights outside of the United States. AOSI II’s ruling will
harm domestic plaintiffs as much as if AOSI I had not ended up in
their favor. Clearly, something has gone wrong. Instead of
consistently diminishing the extraterritorial First Amendment
case by case, the Supreme Court should build up the First
Amendment abroad, affording Americans the same standards of
intraterritorial First Amendment rights. If the Court continues its
current trajectory, the extraterritorial First Amendment will be
almost nonexistent, adopting the most deferential standard to the
government, even for American citizens.
principled basis for making those judgments.”); but see id. at 2100-01 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“We have never purported to give a single ‘bedrock’ answer to . . . myriad
other extraterritoriality questions that might arise in the future. To purport to do so today,
in a case where the question is not presented and where the matter is not briefed, is in my
view a serious mistake.”).
244. See id. at 2086-87 (Kavanaugh, J., majority).
245. Brief for Respondents at 6, AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. 2082 (No. 19-177).
246. Id. at 7.
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Possible Solution: Reframing the Question to Fit Within AOSI I
Doctrine

While the content of AOSI II seemed to have much more of a
foreign emphasis than AOSI I, the case did not need to be
interpreted this way. Justice Breyer’s dissent in AOSI II asserts that
the messages belonged to American speakers who need to use
foreign affiliates abroad.247 Forcing foreign affiliates to adopt the
Act’s speech also distorts the American organizations’ speech.248
Thus, this case is not about foreign organizations’ rights, but about
domestic organizations’ rights, and how far those rights should
extend beyond US borders.249
Misattributed speech is not a new legal concept. 250 The
dissent laid out a strong explanation for why forcing foreign
affiliates to adopt Congress’s views would be misattributed to the
domestic organizations, therefore violating the First
Amendment,251 and the majority does not deny this. The majority
could easily have followed a long line of domestic precedent
regarding misattributed speech mentioned by the dissent, finding
for the plaintiffs that compelling foreign affiliates’ speech violates
the First Amendment rights of their domestic affiliates. Instead, the
majority took a hardline stance against the rights of foreign entities
abroad, ignoring domestic entities’ First Amendment rights in the
process.
Moreover, as Justice Breyer asserts, there is a long line of
precedent around misattributed speech in the United States. 252
The Court likely believed it was creating a precedent that lower
courts could follow when deciding Hurley. If the Court had been
concerned that lower courts would be unable to apply a ruling on
misattributed speech made by foreign affiliates, it could have laid
out a legal standard for future cases, including criteria to look for,
degrees of separation, whether it was necessary to use foreign
affiliates, or any other factors the Court deemed necessary. By
247. AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2099 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc.,
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
251. AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2094-99 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 2097-98; see also generally Abner Greene, (Mis)Attribution, 87 DENV. U. L.
REV. 833 (2010).
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refusing to even look at when misattributed speech might apply in
an international context, the Supreme Court was actively choosing
to curtail the extraterritorial First Amendment. It did not need to
take what seemed to be the easiest approach of drawing a line
separating domestic organizations and their foreign affiliates.253
Even if the majority was concerned that ruling for the
plaintiffs in AOSI II would give non-US citizens too much power, or
take away too much power from the government, the majority did
not need to acknowledge anything about non-US citizens’ rights
abroad. Past cases have made it clear that non-citizens do not have
constitutional rights abroad.254 Thus, the question in AOSI II was
not supposed to be whether the foreign organizations have First
Amendment rights abroad. That argument would not prevail: no
Justice wanted to overrule such strong precedent.255 But the scope
of the extraterritorial First Amendment’s application to Americans
remains unclear.256 Therefore, the issue in AOSI II did not turn on
the rights of foreign organizations, but on the First Amendment
rights of domestic organizations indirectly implicated through
foreign organizations’ speech.
As the dissent mentions, the majority did not need to find that
all foreign organizations had First Amendment rights abroad. It
only had to work within the existing framework of misattributed
speech to find that forcing foreign affiliates of domestic
organizations to adopt certain beliefs violated the domestic
organizations’ First Amendment rights. The Court took a very
different approach, discounting all Americans’ indirect speech
made through non-American affiliates. Justice Breyer’s dissent was
the correct argument, consistent with First Amendment caselaw.
Justice Breyer’s dissent should have been the majority ruling in
AOSI II, protecting American organizations’ First Amendment
253. Cf. Adam Liptak, Justices Are Long on Words but Short on Guidance N.Y. TIMES
(Nov.
17,
2010)
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/18rulings.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print
[https://perma.cc/JB7Y-RQA5] (writing the Supreme Court has increasingly offered only
limited and ambiguous guidance to lower courts in its rulings).
254. Su, supra note 26, at 1413; see, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770-71
(2008); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972).
255. See, e.g., AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2100 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven our most
sweeping statements about foreign citizens’ (lack of) constitutional rights while outside
U.S. Territory have come with limits.”).
256. Su, supra note 26, at 1413.

994

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:5

rights abroad and maintaining the Court’s commitment to First
Amendment rights generally.
C.

Looking Beyond AOSI II

AOSI II created a clear and dangerous precedent for lower
courts to follow: the government is owed deference to act overseas,
even to the point of constitutional violations abroad. AOSI II
adequately conveys the Court’s future intentions to eat away at the
extraterritorial First Amendment in favor of allowing the
government to act as it likes abroad.
Some scholars recommend that lower courts disregard AOSI
II’s ruling, arguing that the case can be disregarded because it
could have been resolved without the majority’s ruling.257 Others
argue that AOSI II’s ruling does not actually settle whether non-US
citizens have US constitutional rights while abroad, and thus the
matter is still open to interpretation.258 But neither of those ideas
get to the root of the problem: the Supreme Court’s fear of
encroaching on the other two branches’ plenary powers, even
when First Amendment rights are at stake. Moreover, lower courts
cannot simply disregard Supreme Court cases they disagree with,
however incorrect or problematic the cases may be. Instead, the
Court needs to build up these rights abroad, laying out clear rules
and when they should apply.
The Supreme Court needs to begin rebuilding the
extraterritorial First Amendment. The Court can start by
overturning its erroneous ruling in AOSI II, implementing the
position laid out in Justice Breyer’s dissent to protect American
organizations’ First Amendment rights. By focusing on the rights of
the American organizations instead of their foreign affiliates, the

257 . See First Amendment—Freedom of Speech—Extraterritoriality—Agency for
International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc., 134 HARV. L.
REV. 490, 498-99 (2020) (“Finally, the unique facts of AOSI II, coupled with the Court’s
traditional hesitancy to rule broadly on the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution,
counsel against adoption of AOSI II’s articulation of extraterritoriality in future cases.”).
258 . Romanoff, supra note 162, at 407 (referring to lower court cases which
disregarded AOSI II to consider that future cases will allow the Constitution to reach nonUS citizens abroad); Joshua J. Schroeder, Conservative Progressivism in Immigrant Habeas
Court: Why Boumediene v. Bush Is the Baseline Constitutional Minimum, 45 HARBINGER 46
(2021) (claiming that the majority’s statement in AOSI II that “foreign citizens outside U.S.
territory do not possess rights under the U.S. Constitution” was dicta, and not law).
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Court can make sure that American organizations will effectively
retain their First Amendment rights abroad.
1. Justice Breyer’s Hypotheticals in AOSI II
In his dissent, Justice Breyer posed several hypothetical
ambiguities which the majority’s hardline ruling did not
address. 259 First, Justice Breyer asked if American officials may
assault long-term permanent residents while outside of US
territories.260 The hypothetical raises valid questions about what
contacts within the United States are necessary for constitutional
rights to apply to a person. A long-term permanent resident is not
a US citizen, but one would hope that he or she would have some
constitutional rights. Justice Breyer’s hypothetical suggests a
comparison between foreign affiliates of domestic organizations
and long-term permanent residents, asking in what contexts
constitutional rights apply to non-US citizens.
Next Justice Breyer asks whether a public university may
revoke admission to an international student based on a political
stance the student posted on social media while outside of the
United States.261 In this hypothetical, although the student posted
on social media outside of the United States, the university is
located within the United States, and the student has substantial
connections within the United States. In addition to highlighting
the motivation of protecting students’ free speech, this scenario
demonstrates the question about what kind of contacts might
afford an individual free speech protections under the
Constitution.

259. Justice Breyer’s hypotheticals include:
Long-term permanent residents are “foreign citizens.” Does the
Constitution therefore allow American officials to assault them at will while
“outside U. S. territory”? Many international students attend college in the
United States. Does the First Amendment permit a public university to
revoke their admission based on an unpopular political stance they took on
social media while home for the summer? Foreign citizens who have never
set foot in the United States, for that matter, often protest when Presidents
travel overseas. Does that mean Secret Service agents can, consistent with
our Constitution, seriously injure peaceful protestors abroad without any
justification?
AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2100 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
260. Id.
261. Id.
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Justice Breyer’s last hypothetical asks whether Secret Service
agents may constitutionally injure, without justification, non-US
citizens peacefully protesting abroad.262 The scenario asks to what
extent the First Amendment may protect individuals with no ties
to the United States, or if the US government can create
repercussions for non-citizens based on their speech. Comparing
Boumediene263 and AOSI II,264 it is unclear in what instances nonUS citizens have constitutional rights. While Boumediene involved
an area outside of US territory that was nonetheless under US
control, it is unclear how much control the US government must
have for the Constitution to apply to everyone, including noncitizens.
These hypothetical scenarios demonstrate the many
remaining questions regarding the extraterritorial First
Amendment applications to non-US citizens,265 as well as the great
nuance required in these situations. While one would like the US
Constitution to protect all victims in Justice Breyer’s hypotheticals,
it is unclear if the Roberts Court would extend constitutional
protections to all those implicated. Instead of making hardline
rules, the Court must look to who is involved and affected before
determining who has First Amendment rights. In looking at these
important questions, the Court can begin creating clear caselaw
that builds up the First Amendment abroad, and allows lower
courts to do the same.
2. The Supreme Court’s Opportunity with Thunder Studios
In 2021, the Ninth Circuit limited AOSI II’s reach by extending
First Amendment protections to defendants located in Australia.266
Although the majority in AOSI II implied that First Amendment
protections were contingent on the non-US citizen being physically
262. Id.
263. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (finding that the Suspension
Clause of the Constitution applied to non-US citizens located outside of US territory
because the area was under the complete control of the United States government).
264 . AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2086 (“[I]t is long settled as a matter of American
constitutional law that foreign citizens outside U. S. territory do not possess rights under
the U. S. Constitution.”).
265. See Su, supra note 26, at 1415 (arguing that a non-US citizen protesting at a US
embassy should be able to invoke First Amendment rights if American security officers
arrest him).
266. Thunder Studios, Inc. v. Kazal, 13 F.4th 736, 743-44 (9th Cir. 2021).
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present in the United States,267 in Thunder Studios, Inc. v. Kazal, the
court did not take AOSI II’s ruling that far. In Thunder Studios, an
Australian citizen, but California resident, sued three Australian
citizens for stalking, even though the three defendants remained in
Australia throughout the series of events that unfolded. 268 The
defendants argued that their actions were speech-related, and
therefore protected under the First Amendment. 269 The Ninth
Circuit found that although the defendants were outside of the
United States, “the recipients of their speech and speech-related
conduct were in California.”270 Therefore, AOSI II did not apply, and
the Court protected the defendants’ speech under the First
Amendment. 271 However, one judge dissented, arguing that the
First Amendment did not extend to defendants without
“substantial connections” to the United States.272
Thunder Studios is an excellent example of a court building up
the extraterritorial First Amendment rather than diminishing it.
The plaintiff in Thunder Studios has recently petitioned the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari.273 His petition largely relies on
AOSI II and its hardline refusal to extend the extraterritorial First
Amendment.274 Taking this case and upholding the Ninth Circuit’s
ruling would be an excellent opportunity for the Supreme Court to
undo much of the damage it inflicted in AOSI II. By upholding the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling and overturning AOSI II, the Court would set

267. AOSI II, 140 S. Ct. at 2086; Romanoff, supra note 162, at 383.
268 . Thunder Studios, 13 F.4th at 740-43. According to the record, these events
included sending rude emails to Thunder Studios employees, engaging a private
investigator in Los Angeles to surveil the plaintiff’s house, and hiring protestors to picket
the plaintiff’s house and Thunder Studios. Id. at 740-41. The record also documents some
of plaintiff’s actions to include a Thunder Studios employee creating several websites
accusing the defendants of money laundering and claiming they were affiliated with the
terrorist group Hezbollah and the Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi. Id. at 741.
269. Id. at 742.
270. Id. at 743.
271. Id. at 744.
272. Id. at 748-52 (Lee, J., dissenting) (drawing on law supposedly going back to the
founding fathers to argue that First Amendment protections did not extend to the
defendants in Australia).
273. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, David v. Kazal, (No. 21-1156) (February 22,
2022).
274. Id. at i, 6-9.
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the stage for future opportunities to demonstrate its interest in
extending First Amendment protections extraterritorially.275
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has been gradually diminishing the
extraterritorial First Amendment for decades, and its most recent
case is no exception. AOSI II contradicts AOSI I’s emphasis on the
First Amendment. The Court in AOSI II effectively took away
domestic organizations’ First Amendment rights by allowing the
government to control the organizations through their affiliates.
The Supreme Court acted wrongly in AOSI II by ruling that foreign
organizations acting abroad do not have First Amendment rights,
even when carrying out their American affiliates’ will. The Court
must immediately grant certiorari on a similar case to overrule
AOSI II in favor of the position outlined in Justice Breyer’s dissent
so the courts can once again protect the First Amendment rights of
Americans overseas.

275. See Romanoff, supra note 162, at 385 (“Thunder Studios speaks to a potential
category of situations in which courts might viably extend a partial noncitizens’
extraterritorial Constitution on more nuanced, subtler grounds . . . Future scholarship and
litigation may further illuminate the scope of this category.”).

